Download or read book Linear Bid in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions written by Tadanobu Tanno and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the eqilibrium linear bid in asymmetric first-price auctions with two bidders and uniform distributions. Introducing asymmetry in linear symmetric equilibrium increases expected revenue subject to constant expected sum of valuations. If auctions are asymmetric, the revenue in the linear equiibrium is larger than that in second-price auctions. If auctions in simple case are similar enough, the revenue in the first-price auction moves close to the optimal revenue as auctions are asymmetric. If auctions are similar enough, the linear equilibrium more efficiently allocates the item than the optimal mechanism.