Models for Budget Constrained Auctions

Models for Budget Constrained Auctions
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:730239280
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Book Synopsis Models for Budget Constrained Auctions by : Abhishek Pani

Download or read book Models for Budget Constrained Auctions written by Abhishek Pani and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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